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INTRODUCTION
“[C]hildren are different.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188
Wn.2d 1, 8, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).
Miller's holding rests on two prongs: (1) youth are generally “less
culpable at the time of their crimes and culpability is of primary relevance
in sentencing,” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22 (citing Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2464) (emphasis in Houston-Sconiers); and (2) children have greater
prospects for reform. Id.
Miller’s substantive rule of constitutional law applies retroactively.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).
Procedural compliance with the substantive constitutional rule must
encompass both of Miller’s prongs and include consideration of the
youth’s diminished culpability at the time of crime commission, as well as
the possibility that the youth will mature and become rehabilitated.
The Washington State Legislature addressed both factors in the statute
mandating the resentencing of children convicted of aggravated murder
(RCW 10.95.030; .035), including those whose sentences had long been
final. In re McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582, 590, 334 P.3d 548 (2014)
(“The Miller fix remedies the unlawfulness of the petitioners' sentences by
providing they must be resentenced in a manner that does not violate the
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Eighth Amendment, consistent with Miller.”).
But, for individuals convicted of less serious crimes, including those
like Scott serving life-equivalent sentences, the Legislature did not provide
for resentencing. Instead, the Legislature authorized only the possibility
of parole in some instances, but not others. But the parole decision is
concerned with the prospect of future behavior, not culpability for the
crime. As a result, RCW 9.94A.730 only provides a partial fix in light of
the two requirements of Miller.
Moreover, under longstanding Washington precedent, the possibility
of release by parole cannot cure an unconstitutional sentence. The
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing, where Scott’s
culpability at the time of the crime can be considered.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
1. Whether the parole provision of RCW 9.94A.730, which was
enacted to provide a remedy for any sentence imposed on a juvenile in
violation of Miller, and which does not include consideration of
diminished culpability due to youth, provides an inadequate remedy to an
offender who received a 900-month exceptional sentence on a murder
conviction such that Miller is a “material” change in the law, as
recognized in Montgomery, that exempts the offender’s personal restraint
petition from the one-year time limit on collateral relief pursuant to RCW
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10.73.100(6).
2. Whether existing precedent requires the Court to disregard the
possibility of parole in evaluating the constitutionality of a de facto life
sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1990, Jai’mar Scott received a 900-month (75-year) exceptional
sentence for a murder committed when he was 17-years old. At
sentencing, Scott's offender score was 0. His standard sentencing range
was 240 to 320 months. The sentencing court did not make a finding of
irreparable corruption or anything resembling such a finding.
On direct appeal, Scott asserted that the sentencing court erroneously
failed to consider the fact that he was a child, not an adult, when imposing
its sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument as bordering on
the “absurd.” State v. Scott, 72 Wn. App. 207, 218, 866 P.2d 1258 (1993).
In 2016, Scott returned to King County Superior Court and
successfully moved that court to vacate his sentence and to conduct a new
sentencing hearing. The trial court agreed, reasoning: “An offender's age
must be taken into consideration by the Court in imposing a sentence.”
The court continued:
Mr. Scott was not sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole, but was sentenced to 900 months. In the case of State v.
Ronquillo, 190 Wn. App. 765 (2015), the Court of Appeals held
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that a sentencing court must consider the attributes of youth when
imposing a "life equivalent" sentence. In that case, 52.5 years was
determined to be a "life equivalent" sentence. Surely then, 900
months or 75 years is also a "life equivalent" sentence.
The State appealed.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the sentence imposed was
unconstitutional, but nevertheless reversed the trial court, holding that the
statutory possibility of parole eliminated any Eighth Amendment
violation. The Court of Appeals held that the “constitutional violation
identified in the Miller line of cases is the failure to allow a juvenile
offender the opportunity for release when his or her crime was the result
of youthful traits,” rejecting Scott’s argument that Miller also requires an
“individualized determination” of how the “offender's youth” decreases
his culpability for the crime. State v. Scott, 196 Wn. App. 961, 971-72,
385 P.3d 783 (2016).
ARGUMENT
I. The Court’s Own Precedent Establishes that the Constitutionality
of a Sentence Cannot Turn on the Possibility of Release by Parole.
The Court of Appeals erred below by finding that Mr. Scott’s
unconstitutional sentence was cured by the possibility of parole,
effectively overturning sub silentio this Court’s holding in State v. Fain,
94 Wn.2d 387, 395, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). Because Fain controls, Scott’s
de facto life sentence must be assessed “according to its literal meaning,”
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without consideration of the possibility for release by parole. Id.
In Fain, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for
the theft of approximately $400. The minimum term that Fain could serve
was 10 years. This Court held that the possibility of parole did not cure
the constitutional sentencing error. This Court stated:
Finally, our cases and the foregoing statutory scheme reveal that
Fain's chances of receiving parole have little to do with the crimes
for which he was sentenced. Rather, his chances depend on his
subsequent behavior in prison.
Id. at 395. This Court continued:
Under these circumstances, and because Fain's chances for
executive grace are not legally enforceable, we feel compelled to
view Fain's sentence according to its literal meaning: a life
sentence.
Id.
Likewise, the possibility of parole under RCW 9.94A.730, which is
legally indistinguishable from the parole option in Fain, does not cure Mr.
Scott’s unconstitutional sentence.
This Court should not overrule Fain. Overruling prior precedent
should not be taken lightly. Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 831, 935 P.2d
588 (1997). This Court requires a clear showing that an established rule is
incorrect and harmful before it may be overruled. Lunsford v. Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 264, 280, 208 P.3d 1092 (2009); In re Stranger
Creek & Tributaries in Stevens Cty., 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508
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(1970) (“[Stare decisis] requires a clear showing that an established rule is
incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.”). No such showing can be
made with respect to the Fain rule.
The lower court’s decision conflicts with Fain regarding how to
evaluate the constitutionality of life sentences. Compare Scott, 196 Wn.
App. at 971-72 (possibility of release by parole cures an otherwise
unconstitutional sentence) with Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 395 (constitutionality of
sentence turns on “its literal meaning” without consideration of possibility
of release by parole). This Court should apply Fain and reverse the lower
court.
To determine whether Mr. Scott’s de facto life sentence is
constitutional, it should be examined on its face, without consideration
that parole may be granted before expiration of the maximum term. Fain,
94 Wn.2d at 393-95 (because “‘parole is simply an act of executive
grace’” and prisoners have no right to parole, it is not equivalent to a
shorter sentence and should not be viewed as such) (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293, 100 S. Ct. 113, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980)).
Courts have upheld parole’s status as an uncertain privilege, rather than a
right, over several decades. See In re Dyer, 175 Wn.2d 186, 196–97, 283
P.3d 1103 (2012) (inmates have no right to parole; parole rests exclusively
with the discretion of the ISRB); In re Ayers, 105 Wn.2d 161, 164, 713
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P.2d 88 (1986) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence.”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979)); January
v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 774, 453 P.2d 876 (1969) (inmates have no right
to parole; parole is a “privilege conferred as an act of grace by the state
through its own administrative agency.”). There is nothing in RCW
9.94A.730 that merits a different rule.
II. Miller Requires Individualized Consideration of Youth.
“(C)hildren are different from adults.”
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 18.
Before imposing “the harshest penalties” on juveniles, a court must
provide individualized consideration of the juvenile, including the
influence of age on the juvenile’s culpability and prospects for
rehabilitation. Id. Individualized consideration of a juvenile’s age is
required because, if “youth (and all that accompanies it) [is] irrelevant to
that harsh sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The risk of
disproportionality flows from the inherently mitigated culpability of
juvenile offenders and the uniquely long incarceration that follows from
sentencing a juvenile to death in prison. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
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70, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). The Court explained that
“youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most serious
punishments,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, and that “the distinctive
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,” id. at 2465; see also id. at 246466, 2468-71.
This Court recently applied the Miller rule in Houston-Sconiers. This
Court held, in accordance with Miller, that sentencing courts must have
complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with
the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice
system. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21. That “discretion to consider
the mitigating qualities of youth” must exist and be exercised at the time
of sentencing itself, regardless of what opportunities for discretionary
release may occur down the line. Id. at 20 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2468-72 (listing reasons why certain mitigating factors had to be
considered at the time of child's initial sentencing)); Graham, 560 U.S. at
69-70 (Eighth Amendment bars imposition of life without parole sentence
on juvenile non-homicide offender, despite the fact that Graham might be
eligible for executive clemency).
No court has given individualized consideration of the required Miller
factors to Mr. Scott.
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A. Scott Is Entitled to the Full Protection of the Constitution.
Of the two procedural remedies available to juvenile offenders in
Washington, parole under RCW 9.94A.730 and re-sentencing, parole may
satisfy Miller’s requirement that a sentencing scheme account for the
possibility of maturation and rehabilitation, but (unless the parole criteria
are amended) re-sentencing is necessary to satisfy Miller’s requirement
that youth be considered in determining culpability under Washington’s
current framework. Under the current statutory scheme, a juvenile
offender’s youth and its relationship to culpability are considered only at a
sentencing hearing, and not during the parole process. Compare RCW
10.95.030(3)(b) (sentencing court must consider “mitigating factors that
account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)”) with RCW 9.94A.730(3) (no reference
to youth or Miller in its list of considerations for release by parole).
The lower court concluded that the applicable parole provision
satisfied the requirements of Miller. The lower court was wrong. Because
the Washington parole system addresses only the second prong of what
Miller holds makes children different, it fails to adequately implement the
substantive constitutional rule. The States are “laboratories for
experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the
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Constitution protects.” Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001,
188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014).
Substantive constitutional rules can be implemented in a variety of
procedural ways. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 122 S. Ct. 2242,
2250, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 41617, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). Ford acknowledged, “we
leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id.
The applicable procedural rule must implement the full constitutional
rule. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239, 245, 31 S. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed.
191 (1911), establishes that if a State's procedures transgress a substantive
constitutional right “in their natural operation,” those procedures are
unconstitutional. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 1460 (1958), the United States Supreme Court again imposed
express constitutional limits on state procedural rules implicating federal
constitutional rights in the specific context of confronting a state law
placing the burden of proof on an individual. Under these cases, a State
cannot create procedures that effectively eviscerate a substantive
constitutional right, but rather “must provide procedures which are
adequate to safeguard against infringement of [the] constitutionally
protected right [ ].” Id. at 521.
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Applying Miller retroactively does not necessarily “require States to
relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile
offender received mandatory life without parole.” Montgomery, 136 Sup.
Ct. at 736. While a Miller violation may be remedied “by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by
resentencing them,” id., that is true only when the parole process includes
consideration of how youth diminishes responsibility.
The lower court in this case construed the “children are different” rule
too narrowly when it stated the “constitutional violation identified in
the Miller line of cases is the failure to allow a juvenile offender the
opportunity for release when his or her crime was the result of youthful
traits.” Scott, 196 Wn. App. at 971. The constitutional violation identified
in Miller, applied retroactively in Montgomery and explained by this Court
in Houston-Sconiers, was the failure to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth at the time of the crime and in the future. In fact, this Court
recognized “Miller is mainly concerned with what must happen at
sentencing because Miller's holding rests on the insight that youth are
generally less culpable at the time of their crimes and culpability is of
primary relevance in sentencing.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22
(emphasis in original).
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The part of the Miller fix statute applicable to this case, RCW
9.94A.730, prioritizes public safety considerations and likelihood of
recidivism. It makes no allowance for consideration of any of the
mitigating factors of youth that Miller requires at the time of sentencing.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22.
While the Washington Legislature conceptually could have adopted a
parole system that considers both prongs of Miller, it did not do so.
Instead, the legislature created a statute that determines release based on
rehabilitation. As a result, a child who received a sentence where the
mitigating qualities of his youth at the time of the crime was not
considered by the sentencing court cannot compel the parole board to
consider that evidence at a hearing to determine whether he will be
released. There is no language in RCW 9.94A.730 directing the ISRB to
consider a defendant’s diminished culpability due to his youth at a parole
hearing.
As a result, the parole statute implements, at most, only half of the
constitutional requirement. Criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants' youthfulness fully into account are flawed. Scott is entitled to
the full protection of the Constitution. Scott is entitled to a hearing in
which the decision-maker has the “complete discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances associated with” his youth. Houston-Sconiers,
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188 Wn.2d at 21. The only forum in Washington where that can currently
take place is at a resentencing hearing.
B. Montgomery Does Not Hold Otherwise.
While Montgomery noted that “[a] State may remedy
a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be
considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them,” 136 S. Ct. at
736, the Court’s comment is classic dictum. Cf. City of Seattle v. Holifield,
170 Wn.2d 230, 244 n.13, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (court's comments in an
opinion that are immaterial to the outcome are dicta); State v. Halgren,
137 Wn.2d 340, 346 n.3, 971 P.2d 512 (1999) (same). While dicta “may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive,” Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 627, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935), the dictum in
Montgomery is not.
First, the Court in Montgomery cited to the Wyoming statute regarding
parole for juveniles in support of this comment. However, Wyoming
provides more than the possibility of parole. The Wyoming statute
expressly provides for commutation by the Governor of the juvenile’s
sentence. And, if the Governor does not commute to a lesser sentence, the
statute makes the juvenile parole eligible after serving a minimum of 25
years, i.e., the same minimum term adopted for juveniles under 16
convicted of aggravated murder in Washington. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–
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10–301(c) (2013).
Further, whether the possibility of release by parole might satisfy the
constitutional requirements of Miller was not essential to the outcome
regarding retroactivity. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725 (certified
question was “whether [Miller’s] holding is retroactive to juvenile
offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when [it] was
decided”).
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court’s reference to
parole simply acknowledges that a state could fashion a parole system in a
manner consistent with both Miller prongs. But the permissive language
does not and could not account for variances in a particular state as to
whether the possibility of parole cures an unconstitutional sentence.
When faced with this issue, courts in other states have determined that
the mere fact that a juvenile offender may be eligible for parole does not
by itself satisfy Graham and Miller. Across the board, where courts have
considered the adequacy of parole to cure an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence, they have found the consideration of youth at some stage of the
process to be paramount. See Md. Restorative Justice Initiative v. Hogan,
Civil Action No. ELH-16-1021, 2017 WL 467731, at *24–27 (D. Md.
Feb. 3, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss and permitting plaintiffs to
pursue claim that Maryland’s system of parole did not provide a
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meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based in part on the failure
of the parole system to account for youth); Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400-01, 140 A.D.3d 34
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (inmate entitled to new parole release hearing at
which his youth would be considered after parole board failed to consider
the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics); Atwell v.
Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016) (re-sentencing required for
juvenile homicide offender because existing statutory parole system failed
to consider youth as required by Miller); Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp.
3d 933, 945 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that
plaintiff was entitled to discovery and full consideration of his claim that
Iowa’s system of parole did not provide him with a meaningful
opportunity for release where decision was based solely on severity of the
crime without consideration of youth, rehabilitation, or maturity); Hayden
v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1010–11 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (finding that
North Carolina’s system of parole did not provide plaintiff a meaningful
opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth Amendment where youth
not considered as part of parole process); Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500,
505–06 (6th Cir. 2014) (remanding for consideration as to whether
Michigan’s system of parole and procedures for parole provide a
meaningful, realistic opportunity for release because youth was not
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considered at district court level). Cf. Connecticut v. Williams-Bey, 167
Conn. App. 744, 747, 144 A.3d 467 (2016) (denying resentencing and
holding that parole hearing where mitigating factors of youth must be
considered is sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements); Arizona v.
Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, 576–77, 334 P.3d 754 (2014) (holding resentencing
not required under Miller because legislature provided for possibility of
release by parole and youth of the defendant was considered as a
mitigating factor at time of sentencing).
These cases make clear that the mere existence of a system of parole is
insufficient to satisfy Graham and Miller, notwithstanding Montgomery’s
dictum. In Mr. Scott’s case, the court below, in error, relied solely upon
the Miller fix statute without considering whether Washington’s system of
parole actually satisfies Graham and Miller.
In addition to failing to require consideration of the qualities of youth
that diminish culpability, additional factors support the conclusion that
Washington’s parole system does not adequately ensure compliance with
the “children are different” doctrine.
Parole practices do not provide the same protections afforded at resentencing. See, e.g., CrR 3.1(b)(2) (lawyer shall be provided at every
stage of the proceedings, including sentencing); CrR 7.1(c)–(d) (new
evidence and other reports may be furnished); and CrR 7.2 (appealability
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of sentence). At a parole proceeding in Washington, there is only a limited
right to counsel1 and limited opportunity to provide evidence,2 and the
denial of parole is only reviewable to the extent that unlawful restraint can
be demonstrated.3 Importantly, the Washington Administrative Code
contains no specific parole considerations for juveniles, who are therefore
treated the same as adult offenders for purposes of procedural and
substantive standards for release. See WAC 381-10-030; WAC 381-40030. Although RCW 9.94A.730(3) includes a presumption of release for
petitioning juveniles, it also vests the board with considerable
discretionary authority and attaches strict conditions upon release.
This discretion rests in the hands of only a few people who are guided
by standards that lack adequate procedural protections. See RCW
9.94.003(1) (Board consists of chair and four members); RCW 9.95.100
(prisoner not to be released unless in the Board’s opinion his or her

1

See Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 783, 658 P.2d 663 (1983) (holding that the Board
is not constitutionally required to provide counsel for indigents at State expense); WAC
381-60-070 (inmate has right to have attorney present, but at her own expense “since the
board has no funds to pay for attorneys”); ISRB Frequently Asked Questions, Wash. State
Dep’t of Corr., http://doc.wa.gov/corrections/isrb/faq.htm#attorney (last visited June 27,
2017) (juvenile inmates “not represented by an attorney during the release eligibility
process, unless Board determines that a cognitive or mental health issue prohibits them
from fully participating in the hearing”).
2
See WAC 381-60-080 (witnesses may be called at parolee’s expense); WAC 381-60090 (Board hearing restrictions); WAC 381-60-150 (admissibility of evidence).
3
Dyer, 164 Wn.2d at 285 (must show unlawful restraint to succeed on a PRP challenge
of an ISRB decision).
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rehabilitation has been complete and is a fit subject for release); WAC
381-40-100 (conditioning eligibility on the presentation of a parole plan
including means of support and suitable residence). Under the Miller fix
statute, “[t]he board shall order the person released …, unless the board
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, …, it is more likely
than not that the person will commit new criminal law violations if
released.” RCW 9.94A.730(3). However, the process is still far too
subjective given this vague and speculative standard and the small number
of people making the determination. Moreover, an inmate has limited
ability to appeal an ISRB decision. Decisions made by the ISRB are only
reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Dyer, 164 Wn.2d at 286
(“We must find the ISRB acted willfully and unreasonably to support a
determination that the parolability decision is arbitrary and capricious.”).
Further, if a prisoner is denied parole, she may not be able to petition
again for five years. RCW 9.94A.730(6).
This inherent subjectivity is further illustrated by how parole, once
granted, can be revoked at almost any time. See January, 75 Wn.2d at 775
(the Board may revise or modify the conditions of parole or suspend
parole based on a report by the parole officer or upon its own discretion);
see also RCW 9.95.425 (allowing for arrest and detention where board has
“reason to believe” parolee has violated law or terms of release). If parole
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is revoked, discretion lies with the ISRB as to whether it will be reinstated.
RCW 9.95.440. This aggregate discretion and subjectivity create serious
doubts as to whether the Washington system of parole for juveniles
provides a meaningful opportunity for release.
Parole also fails to provide a truly meaningful opportunity for release
because when the state imposes a life-equivalent sentence, it subjects the
incarcerated juvenile to an environment that frustrates personal
development, yet relies heavily on reformability in determining whether
parole is warranted. See Sally T. Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful
Opportunity for Release, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 31–34 (2011). For
individuals like Mr. Scott to mature and develop into functional members
of society who are ready for re-integration, meaningful services
encouraging and assessing such development must be provided. Yet the
Washington Department of Corrections is not required to conduct an
assessment of the offender or to identify services appropriate to prepare
the offender for re-integration until five years prior to the expiration of
their uniform twenty-year minimum sentence. See RCW 9.94A.730(2).
This high degree of uncertainty and subjectivity inherent to the parole
process, coupled with the lack of consideration of youth, result in a
process that fails to provide a meaningful opportunity for release as
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required by the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the Court of
Appeals’ decision and grant Mr. Scott a new sentencing hearing in order
to comply with Miller and Fain.
Dated July 5, 2017.
/s/ Jeffrey E. Ellis
Jeffrey E. Ellis #17139
Attorney for Mr. Scott
Law Office of Alsept & Ellis
621 SW Morrison St., Ste 1025
Portland, OR 97205
JeffreyErwinEllis@gmail.com
/s/ Robert S. Chang
Robert S. Chang, WSBA #44083
Melissa R. Lee, WSBA #38808
Attorneys for Mr. Scott
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
901 12th Avenue
Seattle University School of Law
Seattle, WA 98122
changro@seattleu.edu
leeme@seattleu.edu

20

ALSEPT & ELLIS
July 05, 2017 - 11:06 AM
Transmittal Information
Filed with Court:
Appellate Court Case Number:
Appellate Court Case Title:
Superior Court Case Number:

Supreme Court
94020-7
State of Washington v. Jai'mar Scott
90-1-00702-9

The following documents have been uploaded:
940207_Supplemental_Pleadings_20170705110603SC990643_5643.pdf
This File Contains:
Supplemental Pleadings
The Original File Name was ScottJSuppBrief.pdf
A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:
ann.summers@kingcounty.gov
changro@seattleu.edu
leeme@seattleu.edu
paoappellateunitmail@kingcounty.gov
Comments:
Supplemental Brief
Sender Name: jeffrey ellis - Email: jeffreyerwinellis@gmail.com
Address:
621 SW MORRISON ST STE 1025
PORTLAND, OR, 97205-3813
Phone: 503-222-9830
Note: The Filing Id is 20170705110603SC990643

